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1. Introduction
When using the Curry–Howard correspondence in order to obtain executable pro-
grams from mathematical proofs, we are faced with a di7cult problem: to interpret each
axiom of our axiom system for mathematics (which may be, for example, second-
order classical logic, or classical set theory) as an instruction of our programming
language. This problem has been solved for the axiom of excluded middle by Grif-
:n [5], who found that it can be interpreted by means of control instructions like
call-with-current-continuation in SCHEME, catch and throw in LISP or try
: : : with : : : in CAML. The solution for the comprehension axiom scheme for second-
order logic was essentially given by Takeuti [14], who gave a formulation of this
scheme by means of an elimination rule of the second-order universal quanti:er, and
Girard who showed in [4] that this rule can be interpreted by the identity instruction
x x.
In [11], this problem is solved for the axioms of classical Zermelo–Fraenkel set
theory, with the axiom of foundation, but without the axiom of choice.
Indeed, the problem remains for the axiom of choice, which is essential in many
proofs. In most cases, we know how to avoid it, but at the price of much longer proofs.
The weaker axiom of countable choice is fundamental in calculus, measure theory,
etc. (this very important part of mathematics which can be formalized in second-order
classical logic). It is certainly unavoidable.
In this paper, we give an interpretation of the axiom of countable choice (and even
the slightly stronger axiom of dependent choice) in classical second-order logic, as a
programming instruction. Using the results of [11], the same method applies indeed in
ZF set theory. Our solution is to introduce a new instruction in -calculus, which uses
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an enumeration of -terms. We give two diMerent computational interpretations and in
fact implementations, for this instruction: the :rst is similar to the quote instruction of
LISP and the second is given in terms of a clock.
Such an instruction is rather di7cult to handle, because it is incompatible with -
reduction. Therefore, we must set very precisely our framework in order to be able to
give it a type.
This is done in the next section; we use essentially the same framework as in [11].
Then we give the interpretation of the axioms of countable and dependent choice in
terms of the new instruction. In the last section, we apply this method to :rst-order
arithmetical formulas which are provable in classical analysis with choice, in the spirit
of the no-counter-example interpretation of Kreisel. We use the ideas about game
semantics for proofs of such formulas which have been developed in [3].
Other computational interpretations of the countable axiom of choice have been given
in [1], and recently in [2]. It would be interesting to understand the relation with the
present paper.
We now de:ne our programming language: the c-calculus, an extension of the -
calculus with a control instruction and continuations, which is suitable for classical
logic.
2. The c-calculus
We have countably many -variables x; y; : : : ; and stack constants 0; 1; : : : ; and we
de:ne recursively and simultaneously the set 	c of c-terms and the set 
 of stacks.
A stack is a :nite sequence t1 : : : tn: of closed c-terms t1; : : : ; tn, ended with a stack
constant  which is called the bottom of the stack. The c-term t1 is called the top of
the stack, n is its length.
The c-terms are built according to the following rules:
(1) a -variable is a c-term,
(2) if t; u are c-terms (t)u (also denoted by tu) is a c-term,
(3) if t is a c-term and x a -variable, x t is a c-term,
(4) the constant cc is a (closed) c-term,
(5) each stack  gives, in an injective way, a -constant denoted by k, which is a
(closed) c-term. It is called the continuation associated with .
The set of closed c-terms will be denoted by 	0c . Given a stack = t1 : : : tn: and a
closed c-term t, we denote by t :  the stack t:t1 : : : tn: obtained by pushing t on the
top of .
Given the c-terms t; u1; : : : ; un, we denote by (t)u1 : : : un or even by tu1 : : : un the
c-term (: : : ((t)u1)u2 : : :)un, obtained by giving to t the arguments u1; : : : ; un.
3. Execution of processes
	0c×
 is called the set of processes. Thus, a process is a pair, denoted by t ? ,
where t is a closed c-term and  is a stack; t is called the head of the process.
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A process can be performed, a c-term alone cannot. At each time, the head is the
active part of the process, i.e. the part which is executed. Thus, there are four rules of
execution, because the head of the process may have one of the forms (2), (3), (4) or
(5). The rules are the following, with ; ′∈
 and t; u∈	0c :
tu ?   t ? u: (push); cc? t:  t ? k: (store the stack);
x t ? u:  t[u=x]?  (pop); k ? t:′  t ?  (restore the stack):
Remark. For example, when t is an ordinary closed -term and  is a stack constant,
then the reduction of the process t ?  is essentially the weak head reduction of t.
Now, let ⊥ be a :xed cc-saturated set of processes, i.e. with the property
If t ?  ∈ ⊥ and t′ ? ′  t ?  then t′ ? ′ ∈ ⊥ :
A truth value is a subset of 	0c of the form P
⊥ for any P⊂
, where:
P⊥ = {t ∈ 	0c ; (∀ ∈ P) t ?  ∈ ⊥}:
The set of truth values is denoted by R⊥ or simply R if there is no ambiguity. The
truth value of a formula, de:ned below, will be the set of c-terms which realize this
formula.
4. Typing in classical second-order logic
Types are usual formulas of second-order logic, written with the only logical sym-
bols →; ∀ and some :xed function symbols on individuals, taken in a set L (the
language). First-order (also called individual) variables are denoted by lower case let-
ters x; y; : : : and second-order (also called predicate) variables by upper case letters
X; Y; : : : Each second-order variable has an arity in N. Variables of arity 0 are also
called propositional variables.
Notations: F0→ (F1→ · · · → (Fn→G) : : :) is denoted by F0; F1; : : : ; Fn→G.
⊥ is de:ned as ∀X X ; ¬F as F→⊥;
F ∨G as ∀X [(F→X ); (G→X )→X ];
F ∧G as ∀X [(F;G→X )→X ];
∃XF[X ] as ∀Y{∀X (F[X ]→Y )→Y}; ∃x F[x] as ∀Y{∀x(F[x]→Y )→Y};
(Y is a propositional variable, X has an arbitrary arity).
x=y as ∀X (X x→Xy).
We shall use the notation ∃X {F1[X ]; : : : ; Fk [X ]} for the formula:
∀Y{∀X (F1[X ]; : : : ; Fk [X ]→Y )→Y} and the same for the :rst-order quanti:er.
Let x1; : : : ; xk be individual variables and X a k-ary predicate variable. For any
formulas A and F we de:ne A[F=X x1 : : : xk ] by induction on A:
If X is not free in A, then A[F=X x1 : : : xk ] is A.
If A is X (t1; : : : ; tk) then A[F=X x1 : : : xk ] is F[t1=x1; : : : ; tk =xk ].
(A→B)[F=X x1 : : : xk ] is A[F=X x1 : : : xk ]→B[F=X x1 : : : xk ].
(∀y A)[F=X x1 : : : xk ] is ∀y A[F=X x1 : : : xk ].
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(∀Y A)[F=X x1 : : : xk ] is ∀Y A[F=X x1 : : : xk ] if Y is a predicate variable =X
(as usual, y and Y are assumed not to be free in F).
If F is atomic of the form R(x1; : : : ; xk), where R is either a k-ary second-order vari-
able or a parameter (R∈P(
)Mk ), we shall also write A[R=X ] instead of A[F=X x1 : : : xk ].
The deduction rules for classical second-order logic are given below, together with
the typing rules for c-terms; in an expression like ‘t :A’, t is a c-term and A a type,
that is a second-order formula. Let  denote x1 :A1; : : : ; xn :An (a context).
1.   xi :Ai (16i6n),
2.   t :A→B;   u :A ⇒   tu :B,
3. ; x :A t :B ⇒   xt :A→B.
4.   t : (A→B)→A ⇒   cct :A.
5.   t :A ⇒   t :∀x A (resp. ∀X A) if x (resp. X ) is not free in .
6.   t :∀x A ⇒   t :A[=x] for every term  of L.
7.   t :∀X A ⇒   t :A[F=X x1 : : : xk ] for any formula F .
Rule 4 uses Gri7n’s interpretation of the law of Peirce.
Rule 7 uses the Takeuti–Girard interpretation of the comprehension scheme.
A c-term is called proof-like if it contains no continuation. Clearly, every c-term
which is typed in this system is proof-like.
5. Models and realizability
A model M is a set M of individuals (the domain of variation of :rst-order vari-
ables), together with an interpretation fM :Mk →M for each k-ary function symbol f
of L. It is also given a set ⊥ of processes, which is cc-saturated.
The domain of variation of k-ary second-order variables is P(
)M
k
(
 is the set of
stacks).
Let A be a closed second-order formula with parameters in M (:rst-order parameters)
and in P(
)M
k
(second-order k-ary parameters). Its truth value, de:ned below, is
denoted by |A|. Indeed, we have |A|= ‖A‖⊥ for a certain set of stacks ‖A‖ (intuitively,
‖A‖ is an interpretation of the negation of A). Now, what we must really de:ne is
‖A‖, which is done by induction on A:
If A is atomic, i.e. R(t1; : : : ; tk), then t1; : : : ; tk are closed terms with parameters in
M and R∈P(
)Mk is a second-order k-ary parameter. Let ai∈M be the value of ti;
then we set ‖R(t1; : : : ; tk)‖=R(a1; : : : ; ak)⊂
.
The other steps of the induction are:
‖A→B‖= {t : ; t∈|A|; ∈‖B‖};
‖∀x A‖= ⋃a∈M ‖A[a=x]‖; (it follows that |∀x A|=
⋂
a∈M |A[a=x]|);
‖∀X A‖= ⋃{‖A[R=X ]‖;R∈P|(
)Mk} if X is a k-ary predicate variable
(it follows that |∀X A|= ⋂{|A[R=X ]|;R∈P(
)Mk}).
We have ‖⊥‖=
, and thus |⊥| is the least truth value. There is a greatest truth
value, denoted by  which is ∅⊥=	0c (the set of all closed c-terms). We can consider
 as a propositional constant with ‖‖= ∅.
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Remark. We have |⊥|= ∅⇔⊥ = ∅.
Indeed, if ⊥ = ∅, then |⊥|= {t∈	0c ; (∀∈
) t ? ∈⊥}= ∅. Conversely, if ⊥ = ∅,
take t ? ∈⊥ . Then kt∈|⊥| since kt ? ′ t ? .
Notice that, if ⊥ = ∅, the set of truth values is R= {∅; 	0c}= {⊥;} and we have
the ordinary notion of model.
We say that t realizes A (notation: t ‖−A) if t∈|A| i.e. (∀∈‖A‖) t ? ∈⊥ .
The next theorem says that realizability is compatible with classical deduction. It
will be used repeatedly in the following.
Theorem 1 (Adequation lemma). Let A1; : : : ; Ak ; A be closed formulas such that x1 :
A1; : : : ; xk :Ak  t :A is obtained with the above rules of deduction. If ti ‖−Ai for 16i6
k, then t[t1=x1; : : : ; tk =xk ] ‖−A.
In particular, if A is a closed formula and if we can deduce  t :A, then t ‖−A.
We state as a lemma a somewhat stronger and more complicated form of this theo-
rem, which is suitable for an inductive proof.
Lemma 2. Let A1; : : : ; Ak ; A be formulas, the free variables of which are among y1; : : : ;
ym; Y1; : : : ; Yn. Let bi∈M (16i6m) and Pj∈P(
)Mkj (16j6n), where kj is the ar-
ity of Yj. Suppose that x1 :A1; : : : ; xk :Ak  t :A is obtained with the above rules of
deduction.
If ti ‖−Ai[b1=y1; : : : ; bm=ym; P1=Y1; : : : ; Pn=Yn] for 16i6k, then
t[t1=x1; : : : ; tk =xk ] ‖−A[b1=y1; : : : ; bm=ym; P1=Y1; : : : ; Pn=Yn].
We prove this lemma by induction on the length of the derivation of   t :A (
being the context x1 :A1; : : : ; xk :Ak). We shall use the notations t′ for t[t1=x1; : : : ; tk =xk ],
and A′ for A[b1=y1; : : : ; bm=ym; P1=Y1; : : : ; Pn=Yn]. We consider the last rule used (the case
of rule 1 is trivial):
If it is rule 2, we have t= uv and   u :A→B; v :A. We want to show that t′∈|B′|,
that is u′v′ ?∈⊥ for every ∈‖B′‖. But u′v′ ? u′ ? v′ :  and the result follows
since, by the induction hypothesis, we have u′∈|A′→B′| and v′∈|A′| and therefore
v′ : ∈‖A′→B′‖.
If it is rule 3, we have t= x u; A=B→C and ; x :B u :C. We want to show
that x u′∈|B′→C′|, that is x u′ ?∈⊥ for any ∈‖B′→C′‖. Now, we have = v:$
with v∈|B′| and $∈‖C′‖. By the induction hypothesis, u′[v=x] ‖−C′ and thus u′[v=x]?
$∈⊥ . Therefore, x u′ ? v:$∈⊥ , since ⊥ is cc-saturated.
If it is rule 4, we have t=(cc)u and   u : (A→B)→A. We want to show that
t′∈|A′|, that is (cc)u′ ?∈⊥ for any ∈‖A′‖. Since ⊥ is cc-saturated, it su7ces
to show that u′ ? k : ∈⊥ . Now, we prove that k∈|A′→B′|: indeed, if v∈|A′| and
∈‖B′‖, then k ? v: v ? ∈⊥ .
By the induction hypothesis, we know that u′∈|(A′→B′)→A′|, so the result follows.
If it is rule 5 with a :rst-order variable x, we have A=∀x B and   t :B. By the
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induction hypothesis, we have t′∈|B′[a=x]| for every a∈M . Thus t′∈ ⋂a∈M |B′[a=x]|=
|∀x B′|= |A′|.
If it is rule 5 with a second-order variable X of arity p, we have A=∀X B and
  t :B. By the induction hypothesis, we have t′∈|B′[R=X ]| for every R∈P(
)Mp .
Thus t′∈|∀X B′|= |A′|.
If it is rule 6, we have A=B[=x] and   t :∀x B. By the induction hypothesis, we
get t′∈|∀x B′|. Now, if a is the value of  in M , then |B′[=x]|= |B′[a=x]| ⊃ |∀x B′|
and thus t∈|B′[=x]|= |A′|.
If it is rule 7, we have A=B['(z1; : : : ; zp)=Xz1 : : : zp] so that:
A′=B′['′(z1; : : : ; zp)=Xz1 : : : zp]. We have   t :∀X B and we must show that t′∈|A′|.
By the induction hypothesis, we know that t′∈|∀X B′| and the result follows from
Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Let ' (resp. A) be a formula with parameters with the only free variables
z1; : : : ; zp (resp. X of arity p). De;ne R∈P(
)Mp by:
R(a1; : : : ; ap)= ‖'[a1=z1; : : : ; ap=zp]‖ for every a1; : : : ; ap∈M .
Then ‖A['=Xz1 : : : zp]‖= ‖A[R=X ]‖ and therefore:
‖A['=Xz1 : : : zp]‖⊂‖∀X A‖ and |∀X A| ⊂ |A['=Xz1 : : : zp]|.
We prove ‖A['=Xz1 : : : zp]‖= ‖A[R=X ]‖ by induction on the length of A.
It is trivial if X is not free in A, if A is atomic, or if A=B→C.
If A=∀x B then
‖A['=Xz1 : : : zp]‖=
⋃
a∈M
‖B['=Xz1 : : : zp][a=x]‖
=
⋃
a∈M
‖B[a=x]['=Xz1 : : : zp]‖ =
⋃
a∈M
‖B[a=x][R=X ]‖
by induction hypothesis
=
⋃
a∈M
‖B[R=X ][a=x]‖ = ‖∀x B[R=X ]‖ = ‖A[R=X ]‖:
If A=∀Y B, with Y of arity q and Y =X , then:
‖A['=Xz1 : : : zp]‖=
⋃{‖B['=Xz1 : : : zp][S=Y ]‖; S ∈ P(
)Mq}
=
⋃{‖B[S=Y ]['=Xz1 : : : zp]‖; S ∈ P(
)Mq}
=
⋃{‖B[S=Y ][R=X ]‖; S ∈ P(
)Mq} by induction hypothesis
=
⋃{‖B[R=X ][S=Y ]‖; S ∈ P(
)Mq}
= ‖∀Y B[R=X ]‖ = ‖A[R=X ]‖:
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6. Second-order arithmetic
From now on, the set of individuals is N and we suppose that, for each recursive
function + :Nk →N, there is a k-ary function symbol f+ in the language L, which
is, of course, interpreted by + in the model. We shall write + instead of f+, which
will cause no problem. There is no other function symbol and therefore, the model is
completely de:ned as soon as we have chosen the set ⊥ .
Let F be a closed formula. We say that F is realized if there is a proof-like c-term
t such that t ‖−F for every choice of ⊥ . By Theorem 1:
The set of realized formulas is closed under deduction in classical second-order
logic.
Theorem 4. (i) Let a; b∈N. Then:
‖a= b‖= {t : ; t∈	0c ; ∈
}= ‖→⊥‖ if a = b,
‖a= b‖= {t : ; t∈	0c ; ∈
; t ? ∈⊥}= ‖∀X (X →X )‖ if a= b.
(ii) Every equational formula: ∀x1 : : :∀xk [(x1; : : : ; xk)= ′(x1; : : : ; xk)] where  and
′ are terms of L, which is true in N, is realized by the -term I = x x.
(i) Trivial, by de:nition of the formula a= b which is ∀X (Xa→Xb).
(ii) Easy consequence of (i).
The axioms of second-order Peano arithmetic (denoted by PA2) can be given in the
following way in L, with a constant symbol 0, two unary function symbols s (the
successor function) and p (the predecessor function), and two binary symbols +; ∗:
1. s0 =0; p0=0; ∀x(psx= x); ∀x(x + 0= x); ∀x(x ∗ 0=0);
∀x∀y(x + sy)= s(x + y); ∀x∀y(x ∗ sy)= x ∗ y + x;
2. ∀x Int[x] where Int[x]≡∀X {∀y(Xy→Xsy); X 0→X x}.
Formula 2 is the axiom of recurrence; Int[x] reads as “x is an integer”.
It is easy to check that axioms 1 are realized; indeed:
by Theorem 4(i) we get |s0 =0|= |(→⊥)→⊥| and therefore x(x)t ‖− s0 =0
for any t∈	0c . Other axioms 1 are equational formulas, and are realized by I , by
Theorem 4(ii).
Strangely enough, axiom 2 is not realized in general: indeed, it is generally impos-
sible to :nd a proof-like c-term which realizes simultaneously Int[0] and Int[s0], not
to speak of ∀x Int[x]. Moreover, in most interesting models, the negation of axiom 2
is realized by a proof-like c-term.
But our aim is, given a theorem . of PA2, i.e. a consequence of axioms 1 and 2, to
:nd properties of any c-term t built with a proof of .. In order to use realizability,
we want to get rid of the axiom of recurrence. This can be done by the following
well-known property:
Any proof of . in second-order classical logic, using axioms 1 and 2, and any set
E of equational formulas of L true in N, can be transformed into a proof of .Int
using axioms 1, E and the following:
3. ∀x1 : : :∀xk{Int[x1]; : : : ; Int[xk ]→ Int[f(x1; : : : ; xk)]} for each function symbol f of
L. .Int is the formula obtained by restricting to Int all :rst order quanti:ers of .. It
is inductively de:ned as follows:
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If A is atomic, AInt ≡A; (A→B)Int ≡AInt →BInt ;
(∀X A)Int ≡∀X AInt ; (∀x A)Int ≡∀x(Int[x]→AInt).
Therefore, it now remains to prove the following:
Theorem 5. Let f be a k-ary function symbol of L (i.e. representing a recursive
function). Then the formula ∀x1 : : :∀xk{Int[x1]; : : : ; Int[xk ]→ Int[f(x1; : : : ; xk)]} is re-
alized.
We :rst need a result about usual -calculus. We will use the following:
Notations: 	 is the set of usual -terms. If t; u∈	, then t t′ means that t is
-equivalent to t′; t t′ means that t reduces to t′ by weak head reduction: one step
of weak head reduction is (x u)vv1 : : : vn (u[v=x])v1 : : : vn.
The following lemma explains why we use the same symbol  for weak head
reduction of ordinary -terms and execution of processes.
Lemma 6. Let /; 0; t1; : : : ; tk ∈	 be closed ordinary -terms and ∈
. If 0 is not an
application (i.e. 0 is a -constant or 0= x 0′) and if / (0)t1 : : : tk , then / ?  0 ? t1:
: : : :tk : .
The proof is by induction on the length of the weak head reduction / (0)t1 : : : tk .
The :rst step is /=(y u)vv1 : : : vn (u[v=y])v1 : : : vn and, by induction hypothesis:
(u[v=y])v1 : : : vn ?  0 ? t1: : : : :tk : . Now, the :rst n− 1 steps of reduction from the
left-hand side concern some application; since 0 is not an application, we have not yet
reached the right-hand side after these steps. Therefore, we have:
(u[v=y])? v1 : : : vn : 0 ? t1: : : : :tk : . Thus:
/ ? =(y u)vv1 : : : vn ?  (u[v=y])? v1 : : : vn :  0 ? t1: : : : :tk : .
Notations: For t; u∈	c we de:ne:
(t)nu for n∈N by: (t)0u= u; (t)n+1u=(t)(t)nu.
t ◦ u by x(t)(u)x, where x does not appear in t; u.
Lemma 7. Let f; a be -constants and /∈	 such that / (f)na. Suppose that
+ ‖−∀y(Xy→Xsy) and 1 ‖−X 0. Then /[+=f; 1=a] ‖−Xsn0.
Proof. By induction on n. If n=0, then / a and therefore / a. If ∈‖X 0‖, then
/ ?  a ?  by Lemma 6. Therefore /[+=f; 1=a]? 1 ? ∈⊥ .
If n¿0, then / (f)0 with 0 (f)n−1a. Let ∈‖Xsn0‖; then / ? f ?0 :  by
Lemma 6 and /[+=f; 1=a]?+?0[+=f; 1=a] : . Now, +∈|Xsn−10→Xsn0| and, by
induction hypothesis, 0[+=f; 1=a]∈|Xsn−10|. Therefore +?0[+=f; 1=a] : ∈⊥ .
Theorem 8. Let n∈N and 3∈	 such that 3 fx(f)nx. Then 3 ‖− Int[sn0].
Let + ‖−∀y(Xy→Xsy); 1 ‖−X 0 and ∈‖Xsn0‖; we must show that 3 ?+:1 : ∈⊥ .
Since 3 fx(f)nx, we have 3 f 0, 0 a / and / (f)na. By Lemma 6, we
have 3 ?+:1 : f 0?+:1 : 0[+=f]? 1 : . Again by Lemma 6, we have:
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0 ? 1 :  a / ? 1 :  /[1=a]? and thus 0[+=f]? 1 :  /[+=f; 1=a]?. Finally, we
get 3 ?+:1 :  /[+=f; 1=a]?. But, by Lemma 7, we have /[+=f; 1=a]∈|Xsn0| and thus
3 ?+:1: /[+=f; 1=a]?∈⊥ .
Theorem 9. Let T =(fn(n)g g ◦ s)f0, where s is a -term for the successor (e.g.
s= nfx(f)(n)fx). If +∈	0c is such that +? sn0 : ∈⊥ for all ∈‖X ‖, then T+ ‖−
Int[sn0]→X .
Remark. T is called a storage operator (cf. [10]). We can understand intuitively
what it does by comparing the weak head reductions of +3 and T+3, where + and 3
are ordinary -terms, 3 fx(f)nx (a Church integer). Then T+3 (+)(s)n0, which
means that the computation of the integer argument 3 of + takes place :rst. In other
words, T emulates call-by-value inside weak head reduction, which is a call-by-name
reduction.
Notice that we use the same symbol s for a -term and a function symbol in L.
Proof. Let 3 ‖− Int[sn0] and ∈‖X ‖; we have to show that T+? 3 : ∈⊥ .
We de:ne a unary second-order parameter P by:
‖P(j)‖= {sn−j0 : } for 06j6n and ‖P(j)‖= ∅ for j¿n.
We have + ‖−P0 by hypothesis on +. We show that g g ◦ s ‖−∀x(Px→Psx), which
means that g g ◦ s∈|P(j)→P(j + 1)| for all j∈N. This is trivial for j¿n.
If j¡n, let /∈|P(j)|; we must show g g ◦ s ? /:sn−j−10 : ∈⊥ . But we have:
g g ◦ s ? /:sn−j−10 :  / ◦ s ? sn−j−10 :  / ? sn−j0 : ∈⊥ by hypothesis on /.
Now, we get T+? 3 :  3 ? g g ◦ s:+:0 :  which is in ⊥ because:
3 ‖−∀x(Px→Psx); P0→Psn0 by hypothesis, + ‖−P0 and 0 :∈‖Psn0‖.
We can now prove Theorem 5. For simplicity, we suppose k =1, so that we have a
recursive function f :N→N. Let +∈	 be a -term which represents f: for n∈N, we
have +sn0 fx(f)px with p=f(n). Therefore +sn0  f / and, by Theorem 8,
we have f / ‖− Int[sp0]. Let ∈‖Int[sp0]‖; we have f /?∈⊥ . Now, by Lemma 6,
we have +sn0? f /?; but this reduction has necessarily at least one step, because
+sn0 = f / (+sn0 does not begin by ). Therefore +? sn0 :  f /?∈⊥ . Since this
is true for every ∈‖Int[sp0]‖, it follows from Theorem 9 that T+‖−Int[sn0]→ Int[sp0],
i.e. T+ ‖− Int[n]→ Int[f(n)]. Since this is true for each n∈N, we get:
T+ ‖−∀x(Int[x]→ Int[f(x)]).
7. The countable axiom of choice
The axioms of classical analysis are: second-order arithmetic and the axiom of count-
able choice. Thus, in order to get programs from proofs in classical analysis, it remains
the problem: is it possible to realize this axiom? This section is devoted to a positive
answer to this problem.
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The countable axiom of choice is the following axiom scheme:
∀Y˜∃Z∀x(∃X F[x; X; Y˜ ]→ F[x; Z(x; y)=Xy; Y˜ ]):
F is a second-order formula in which the 2-ary variable Z does not appear; X is of
arity 1; Y˜ =(Y1; : : : ; Yn) is a :nite sequence of second-order variables (which are, in
fact, parameters).
We will rather write this axiom scheme in the contrapositive form:
(CAC) ∀Y˜∃Z∀x(F[x; Z(x; y)=Xy; Y˜ ]→ ∀X F[x; X; Y˜ ]):
This means that Z(x; y) is some counterexample to ∀X F[x; X ], whenever any exists.
In order to realize this scheme, we introduce in the c-calculus a new constant
denoted by 9. We consider a :xed bijection n → tn of N onto 	0c (we do not even
need that this bijection be recursive); let + → n+ be the inverse function. For every
n∈N, we denote by n a :xed -term which is  fx(f)nx, for example fx(f)nx
itself, or sn0, where s is a -term for the successor. We extend the rules of execution
of processes by giving the following rule for 9:
9 ? +:  + ? n+: for every + ∈ 	0c and  ∈ 
:
Remark. We shall give below our intuitive interpretations of such a reduction rule.
From now on, of course, when we consider a set ⊥ of processes, it will be cc-
saturated for the extended notion of reduction.
Theorem 10. Let F[x; X ] be a formula with parameters (X being unary). There exists
' :N3→P(
) such that: 9 ‖−∀x{∀n(Int[n]→F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy])→∀X F[x; X ]}.
For each n∈N, de:ne Pn(⊥)= {∈
; tn ? n : =∈⊥}. Now, for every individual x, we
have ‖∀X F[x; X ]‖= ⋃{‖F[x; R=X ]‖; R∈P(
)N}. Therefore, for every x; n∈N such
that Pn(⊥) ∩ ‖∀X F[x; X ]‖ = ∅, there is a function R :N→P(
) such that Pn(⊥) ∩
‖F[x; Ry=Xy]‖ = ∅. By the axiom of countable choice, we get a function ' :N3→P(
)
which has the following property: if Pn(⊥)∩‖∀X F[x; X ]‖ = ∅ then Pn(⊥)∩‖F[x; '(x; n;
y)=Xy]‖ = ∅.
Now, let x be :xed (in N, which is the set of individuals) and consider ∈‖∀X F[x;
X ]‖ and +∈|∀n(Int[n]→F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy])|. We must show that 9 ?+ : ∈⊥ and, by
the rule for 9, it is su7cient to show +?n+ : ∈⊥ .
If it is not true, we put n= n+, so that tn =+ and we have ∈Pn(⊥)∩‖∀X F[x; X ]‖.
By de:nition of ', there exists ′∈Pn(⊥) ∩ ‖F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy]‖. From ′∈Pn(⊥),
we get tn ? n : ′ =∈⊥ . But, since ′∈‖F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy]‖, by the hypothesis on +, we
have +?n : ′∈⊥ , because n ‖− Int[sn0] (Theorem 8). This is a contradiction, because
+= tn.
From this theorem, we can get a c-term with 9 which realizes the axiom of countable
choice as follows:
Lemma 11. There is a c-term S such that
S :∀Y∃Z{Func(Z);∀x(∀n[Z(x; n)→Y (x; n)]→∀n[Int(n)→Y (x; n)])};
where Func(Z) is the formula ∀x∀n∀n′(Z(x; n); Z(x; n′)→ n= n′).
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Remember that ∃Z{A; B} is a notation for ∀X {∀Z(A; B→X )→X }. It is equivalent
to ∃Z(A∧B).
Proof. The lemma is trivial, because this formula is clearly provable in classical
second-order logic: take simply for Z(x; n) the formula which says that n is the :rst
integer such that ¬Y (x; n) if there exists one; i.e. Z(x; n) is
Int[n]∧¬Y (x; n)∧∀p∀q[Int[p]; Int[q]; p+ q+ 1= n→Y (x; p)].
Now, by Theorem 10, we know that
9 ‖−∀x{∀n(Int[n]→F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy])→∀X F[x; X ]}.
Take for Y (x; n) in Lemma 11, the formula F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy]. We get
x(S)y(x)ab(9)(y)ab
 ∃Z{Func(Z);∀x(∀n(Z(x; n)→ F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy])→ ∀X F[x; X ])}
for any formula F . Therefore, if we de:ne the axiom scheme (CCA) as
(CCA) ∃U∃Z{Func(Z);∀x(∀n(Z(x; n)→F[x; U (x; n; y)=Xy])→∀X F[x; X ])};
we obtain
(*) . ‖− (CCA) for every formula F
with .= z(z)x(S)y(x)ab(9)(y)ab
The axiom scheme (CCA) is trivially equivalent to (CAC) and is realized by a c-
term which is independent of F . However, in order to derive (CAC) from (CCA), we
need the “theorem scheme of extensionality”:
∀X∀Y{∀x(Xx ↔ Yx)→ (F[X ]↔ F[Y ])}:
This theorem scheme is proved by (concrete) induction on F and therefore the asso-
ciated c-term will eventually depend on F .
Now, we can add to our deduction rules 1; : : : ; 7 the following one:
8. . :∃U∃Z{Func(Z);∀x(∀n(Z(x; n)→F[x; U (x; n; y)=Xy])→∀X F[x; X ])}:
Rules 1–8 form a deduction system for “classical analysis”, i.e. classical second-
order logic with countable choice. It follows from (*) that the adequation lemma
(Theorem 1) remains valid for these deduction rules.
8. Dependent choice
In this section, we show, by the same method, that the axiom scheme of dependent
choice can be realized. This axiom scheme is
∀X∃Y H [X; Y ]→ ∀X0∃Z{∀y(X0(y)↔ Z(0; y));
∀k(Int[k]→ H [Z(k; y)=Xy; Z(k + 1; y)=Yy])}
for any formula H in which the variable Z does not appear.
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Let 〈x; y〉 be a binary function symbol, which represents a bijection from N2 onto
N. We assume it to be recursive, so that Theorem 5 applies.
Theorem 12. Let F[X; Y ] be a formula with parameters (X; Y being unary). For
every X0 :N→P(
), there exists A :N3→P(
) such that A(0; x; y)=X0(y) and
9 ‖−∀x∀k(∀n{Int[n]→F[A(k; x; y)=Xy; A(k+1; 〈n; x〉; y)=Yy]}→∀YF[A(k; x; y)=Xy; Y ]).
We :rst prove:
Lemma 13. For every U :N2→P(
), there exists V :N2→P(
) such that
9 ‖−∀n{Int[n]→F[U (x; y)=Xy; V (〈n; x〉; y)=Yy]}→∀Y F[U (x; y)=Xy; Y ].
The proof is the same as Theorem 10. Let Pn(⊥)= {∈
; tn ? n :  =∈⊥} and de:ne
V :N2→P(
) by the following condition: if Pn(⊥)∩‖∀Y F[U (x; y)=Xy; Y ]‖ = ∅ then
Pn(⊥) ∩ ‖F[U (x; y)=Xy; V (〈n; x〉; y)=Yy]‖ = ∅.
Now let x be :xed in N and consider +∈|∀n{Int[n]→F[U (x; y)=Xy; V (〈n; x〉; y)
=Yy]}| and ∈‖∀Y F[U (x; y)=Xy; Y ]‖. We have to show that 9 ?+ : ∈⊥ , i.e. +?n+:
∈⊥ . If it is not true, we put n= n+, so that tn =+ and we have
∈Pn(⊥) ∩ ‖∀Y F[U (x; y)=Xy; Y ]‖.
Thus, by de:nition of V , there exists ′∈Pn(⊥) ∩ ‖F[U (x; y)=Xy; V (〈n; x〉; y)=Yy]‖.
Since ′∈Pn(⊥), we have tn ? n : ′ =∈⊥ . But ′∈‖F[U (x; y)=Xy; V (〈n; x〉; y)=Yy]‖ and
thus, by hypothesis on +, we get +?n : ′∈⊥ . This is a contradiction because += tn.
By Lemma 13, we have (∀U ∈P(
)N2 )(∃V ∈P(
)N2 )'(U; V ), where '(U; V ) is
the formula 9 ‖−∀n{Int[n]→F[U (x; y)=Xy; V (〈n; x〉; y)=Yy]}→∀Y F[U (x; y)=Xy; Y ].
Therefore, we obtain Theorem 12 by means of an application of the axiom of de-
pendent choice to the formula '(U; V ).
Now, by Theorem 12, the following formula is realized by x(x)II9 (with
I = x x):
(∗) ∀X0∃A{∀x∀y[A(0; x; y)→ X0(y)];∀x∀y[X0(y)→A(0; x; y)];
∀x∀k(∀n{Int[n]→ F[A(k; x; y)=Xy; A(k + 1; 〈n; x〉; y)=Yy]}
→ ∀Y F[A(k; x; y)=Xy; Y ])}:
Therefore, in order to realize the axiom of dependent choice, it is su7cient to derive this
axiom from formula (∗), where F is ¬H , in classical second-order logic. The derivation
is as follows: de:ne inductively the sequence nk of integers by the conditions n0 = 0 and
nk+1 = 〈n; nk〉 for the :rst integer n such that H [A(k; nk ; y)=Xy; A(k + 1; 〈n; nk〉; y)=Yy].
The formula (∗) and the hypothesis ∀X∃Y H (X; Y ) ensure that such an integer always
exists. Finally, if we de:ne Z(k; y) by A(k; nk ; y), we get
∀k{Int[k]→H [Z(k; y)=Xy; Z(k + 1; y)=Yy]} and ∀y(Z(0; y)↔X0(y)).
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9. Variant and interpretations
We can get the same results by using, instead of 9, a dual instruction U9 which
works on stacks instead of terms. Consider now a bijection n → n of N onto 
, and
let  → n be the inverse function. We introduce into the c-calculus a new constant
denoted by U9 and we extend the rules of execution of processes by giving the following
rule for U9:
U9 ? +:  + ? n: for every + ∈ 	0c and  ∈ 
:
We have the analogue of Theorem 10 and the proof is even simpler:
Theorem 14. Let F[x; X ] be a formula with parameters (X being unary). There exists
' :N3→P(
) such that: U9 ‖−∀x{∀n(Int[n]→F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy])→∀X F[x; X ]}.
For every individual x and every stack , we have
 ∈ ‖∀X F[x; X ]‖ ⇔ (∃R ∈ P(
)N)  ∈ ‖F[x; R=X ]‖:
Therefore, by the axiom of countable choice, there exists a function ' :N3→P(
)
such that ∈‖∀X F[x; X ]‖⇔ ∈‖F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy]‖. We show that ' has the de-
sired property: consider an individual x∈N; +∈|∀n(Int[n]→F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy])| and
∈‖∀X F[x; X ]‖. We must show that U9 ?+ : ∈⊥ and, by the rule for U9, it is su7cient
to show +?n : ∈⊥ . But this is clear because:
• by hypothesis on +, we have + ‖− Int(sn0)→F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy];
• by Theorem 8, we have n ‖− Int(sn0);
• and by hypothesis on  and the de:nition of ', we have ∈‖F[x; '(x; n; y)=Xy]‖.
We get in the same way an analogue of Lemma 13. Now, by exactly the same reasoning
as above, we realize the axioms of countable choice and of dependent choice, using U9
instead of 9.
9.1. The ‘quote’ interpretation
The rule of reduction for the instruction 9 is
9 ? +:  + ? n+::
This rule makes 9 very similar to the quote instruction of LISP. Indeed n+ may
be used in the same way as (quote +), if we assume that + → n+ is a recursive
bijection from 	0c onto N. For example, since nu is then a recursive function of ntu,
we can de:ne, using 9, an instruction 9′ such that 9′ ?+: : +?n : : let p be a
closed -term such that (p)ntu nu and let 9′= xy(9)(d x ◦p)y. As we can see in
this example, the instruction 9 is not compatible with -reduction: indeed, we cannot
replace (d x ◦p)y with x ◦p.
As observed by the referee, in the program associated with the axiom of countable
choice, the instruction 9 is not used in the same way as the ‘quote’ instruction is
habitually used in LISP. In fact, the only operation which is performed on the integers
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n+ is to compare them, and + is never retrieved from n+. In other words, there is no
use of the ‘unquote’ or ‘eval’ instruction which, in LISP, is the inseparable companion
of ‘quote’.
Nevertheless, it is a fact that the instruction 9 can be implemented by means of the
‘quote’ instruction. Moreover, it is quite possible that, in future work, trying to interpret
some other axioms or theorems, someone will use the program ‘eval’ in interaction
with 9.
9.2. The clock interpretation
We give now another interpretation for the instruction 9 (which is also valid for U9).
We observe that the application n → tn may be any surjective map from N onto 	0c .
The reduction rule for 9 is then:
9 ? +:  + ? n::;
where n is any integer such that tn =+. This suggests the following interpretation:
9 is an input instruction and, when it comes in head position, the process 9 ?+ : 
waits for some integer n which is provided by some human operator or some external
process. Then we have the reduction 9 ?+ : +?n :  and the execution goes on. The
only constraint is that “+ must be retrievable from n”, i.e. the integers provided to the
processes 9 ?+ :  and 9 ?+′ : ′ with + =+′, must be diMerent.
A very simple and natural way to obtain this behaviour is to provide the integer n
by means of a clock, since two diMerent c-terms cannot appear at the same time. In
other words, we may suppose there is a second process running aside the main one,
which simply increments an integer at each step of reduction. This process provides
the integer n when needed, that is when 9 comes in head position in the main process.
This method gives a completely diMerent way of implementing the instruction 9. I
think that the behaviour of the program associated with the axioms of countable or
dependent choice is easier to understand with this implementation.
10. Arithmetical theorems
In this section, we apply the above results to study the behaviour of programs
associated with proofs of arithmetical theorems in PA2+CAC. As an example, we
consider :rst a ?02 formula ' of the form ∃x∀y[+(x; y)= 0] where + is a recursive
function.
Consider the following game between two players named ∃ and ∀ :∃ plays an integer
m; ∀ reply with an integer n; the game stops at the :rst moment when +(m; n)= 0 and
then ∃ wins; thus, ∀ wins if and only if the game lasts in:nitely long. The following
is trivial:
∃ has a winning strategy if and only if N |='; moreover, in this case, there is an
obvious winning strategy for ∃: to play successively 0; 1; 2; : : : :
We will show (Theorem 15) that the program associated with a proof of ' in
PA2+CAC acts as a winning strategy for the above game. We :rst get rid of the
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axiom of recurrence as explained above and thus, we consider a proof in “classical
analysis” of the formula:
'Int ≡ ∀x[Int(x);∀y(Int(y)→ +(x; y) = 0)→ ⊥]→ ⊥:
Now we add the following constants to c-calculus: @np (n; p∈N) and @ which is
an input instruction. Thus the c-terms become interactive programs. Once again, we
extend the rules of execution of processes by giving the following rule for @:
@ ? sn0:/: / ? sp0:@np:′
for n; p∈N; /∈	0; ; ′∈
; s is a :xed -term for the successor in Church integers.
This rule is non-deterministic, since the integer p and the stack ′ are arbitrary.
The intuitive meaning of this rule is as follows: in the left-hand member the program,
which stands for the player ∃, proposes the integer n; then, in the right-hand member,
the opponent ∀ replies with p and the execution goes on; @np keeps a trace of the
ordered pair (n; p).
Theorem 15. Suppose that  A : [∃x∀y(+(x; y)= 0)]Int in classical second-order logic
with choice. Then every reduction of A ? T@ :  following  ends up into @np ? ′ with
+(n; p)= 0. T is the storage operator of Theorem 9.
We de:ne ⊥ as the set of processes all reductions of which end up into @np ? ′ with
+(n; p)= 0 for some stack ′. We must show that A ? T@ : ∈⊥ for every ∈
.
By Theorem 1, we have A ‖−∀x[Int(x);∀y(Int(y)→+(x; y)= 0)→⊥]→⊥.
Therefore, by de:nition of ‖−, it is su7cient to prove that:
T@ ‖−∀x[Int(x);∀y(Int(y)→+(x; y)= 0)→⊥].
Let n∈N; we have to show T@ ‖− Int[sn0]→ [∀y(Int(y)→+(n; y)= 0)→⊥].
By Theorem 9, this amounts to show that if ∈
 and / ‖−∀y(Int(y)→+(n; y)= 0)
then @ ? sn0:/ : ∈⊥ . By the very de:nition of ⊥ , it is su7cient to show that / ? sp0:@np:
∈⊥ for every p∈N and ∈
. But, by hypothesis on /, for any p∈N and $∈
‖+(n; p)= 0‖, we have / ? sp0:$∈⊥ . Therefore, it is su7cient to show that @np : ∈
‖+(n; p)= 0‖ for any p∈N and ∈
.
If +(n; p)= 0 then, by Theorem 4(i), ‖+(n; p)= 0‖ is ‖∀X (X →X )‖ that is:
{t:; t∈	0c ; ∈
; t ? ∈⊥}. But, by de:nition of ⊥ , we have also @np ? ∈⊥ , so
that @np : ∈‖+(n; p)= 0‖.
If +(n; p) =0, again by Theorem 4(i), we have ‖+(n; p)= 0‖= ‖→⊥‖ that is:
{t:; t∈	0c ; ∈
}; therefore, we have again @np : ∈‖+(n; p)= 0‖.
It follows that any proof of ' in classical second-order arithmetic with countable
axiom of choice provides an interactive program which can stand in for the player ∃
and which wins against every opponent.
Indeed, after each reply of the opponent, the program provides an object (sn0; /)
made up with an integer n (the provisional solution) and an exception handler /
which is used in case of a relevant reply from the opponent.
These are the two arguments of @ which can therefore be seen as a pointer to this
object.
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The general case
Consider now an arithmetical theorem ' of the form:
∃x1∀y1 : : :∃xk∀yk(+(x1; y1; : : : ; xk ; yk)= 0) where + is recursive.
The game associated with ' is now the following:
A position of the game is an integer sequence n1p1 : : : nipi (06i6k). The player
∃ chooses :rst an already reached position n1p1 : : : nipi, with 06i¡k, and an integer
ni+1; then ∀ chooses an integer pi+1. The position n1p1 : : : ni+1pi+1 is then reached.
If i + 1= k and +(n1; p1; : : : ; nk ; pk)= 0, then the game stops and ∃ won. In every
other case, the play goes on. Thus ∀ wins if and only if the game lasts in:nitely long.
It is easily seen that N |=' if and only if the player ∃ has a winning strategy for
this game. Moreover, we can eMectively (and easily) describe such a winning strategy,
which does not even depend on ', but only on the number k of quanti:ers:
The player ∃ uses an eMective enumeration of Nk . When he comes to the k-uple
n1 : : : nk , he chooses the longest already reached position of the form n1p1 : : : nipi. We
know that i¡k because this position was reached for a k-uple of integers diMerent
from n1 : : : nk . Then he successively plays ni+1; : : : ; nk regardless of the choices of ∀.
Then he takes the next k-uple of integers.
If this play is in:nite, we get k functions fi(x1; : : : ; xi) such that
N |= ∀x1 : : :∀xk {+[x1; f1(x1); x2; f2(x1; x2); : : : ; xk ; fk(x1; : : : ; xk)] = 0}
which is the Skolem form of ¬'; thus N |=¬'.
Conversely, if N |=¬', there exists k functions fi(x1; : : : ; xi) such that the Skolem
form of ¬' is satis:ed. Of course, they provide a winning strategy to the opponent ∀.
Let us now introduce into the c-calculus the constants @n1p1 :::nipi for 06i6k (one
for each position of the game). Their rule of reduction is as follows:
For 06i6k − 2 : @n1p1 :::nipi ? sni+10:/ :  / ? spi+10:T@n1p1 :::ni+1pi+1 : ′
(T is the storage operator of Theorem 9).
For i= k − 1 : @n1p1 :::nk−1pk−1 ? snk0:/ :  / ? spk0:@n1p1 :::nkpk : ′.
For i= k no reduction is possible.
It is a non-deterministic rule, since pi+1 and ′ are arbitrary.
The intuitive meaning of these rules is the following: in the left-hand side, the pro-
gram, which stands for the player ∃, chooses the previously reached position n1p1 : : : ni
pi and proposes the integer ni+1; then, in the right-hand side, the opponent ∀ replies
with pi+1 and the execution goes on; @n1p1 :::ni+1pi+1 keeps a trace of the fact that the
position n1p1 : : : ni+1pi+1 has been reached.
Theorem 16. Suppose that  A : [∃x1∀y1 : : :∃xk∀yk(+(x1; y1; : : : ; xk ; yk)= 0)]Int in clas-
sical second-order logic with choice. Then every reduction of A ? T@ :  following 
ends up into @n1p1 :::nkpk ? 
′ with +(n1; p1; : : : ; nk ; pk)= 0.
Remark. @ is the constant associated with the empty position of the game.
The meaning of the theorem is that each proof of 'Int in classical second-order logic
with axiom of choice gives an interactive program, which wins against every strategy
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of the opponent, in the game associated with the formula:
' ≡ ∃x1∀y1 : : :∃xk∀yk(+(x1; y1; : : : ; xk ; yk) = 0):
This theorem is closely related to the no-counter-example interpretation of Kreisel
[7,8] (see also [3,6,13]): Kreisel has shown that, if ' is a theorem of :rst-order
Peano arithmetic, then there exists type recursive functionals in the sense of [13]
Fi(f1; : : : ; fk) (16i6k) such that:
+[/1; f1(/1); /2; f2(/1; /2); : : : ; /k ; fk(/1; : : : ; /k)] = 0 with /i = Fi(f1; : : : ; fk)
for any functions fi :Ni→N (16i6k), i.e. for any strategy of the opponent. Theorem
16 associates such a functional to each proof of ' in classical analysis (with axiom
of choice) and gives it as an explicit program which is a winning strategy for the
player ∃.
Proof. We de:ne ⊥ as the set of processes all reductions of which end up into
@n1p1 :::nkpk ? 
′ with +(n1; p1; : : : ; nk ; pk)= 0. We have to show that A ? T@ : ∈⊥ for
every ∈
. For 06i6k, we set
Ai(x1; y1; : : : ; xi; yi) ≡ [∃xi+1∀yi+1 : : :∃xk∀yk(+(x1; y1; : : : ; xk ; yk) = 0)]Int :
By Theorem 1, it is su7cient to show that T@ : ∈‖A0‖ for every stack . In fact, we
shall show, by decreasing induction from k, that for every stack :
Kn1p1 :::nipi : ∈‖Ai(n1; p1; : : : ; ni; pi)‖ for 06i6k where
Kn1p1 :::nipi is T@n1p1 :::nipi for 06i¡k and @n1p1 :::nkpk for i= k.
We show this :rst for i= k; we have to show that:
@n1p1 :::nkpk : ∈‖+(n1; p1; : : : ; nk ; pk)= 0‖.
If +(n1; p1; : : : ; nk ; pk) =0 then, by Theorem 4(i), we have
‖+(n1; p1; : : : ; nk ; pk)= 0‖= ‖→⊥‖, hence the result.
If +(n1; p1; : : : ; nk ; pk)= 0, then, by Theorem 4(i), we have
‖+(n1; p1; : : : ; nk ; pk)= 0‖= {t : ; t∈	0c ; ∈
; t ? ∈⊥}.
But @n1p1 :::nkpk ? ∈⊥ by de:nition of ⊥ ; hence the result.
Assuming the property for i + 1, we have to show that:
T@n1p1 :::nipi 
∀xi+1{Int(xi+1);∀yi+1[Int(yi+1)→ Ai+1(n1; p1; : : : ; ni; pi; xi+1; yi+1)]→ ⊥}:
That is, for every ni+1∈N:
T@n1p1 :::nipi ‖− Int(ni+1)→{∀yi+1[Int(yi+1)→Ai+1(n1; p1; : : : ; ni; pi; ni+1; yi+1)]→⊥}.
By Theorem 9, it is su7cient to show that @n1p1 :::nipi ? s
ni+10:/ : ∈⊥ for every stack 
and every /∈|∀yi+1[Int(yi+1)→Ai+1(n1; p1; : : : ; ni; pi; ni+1; yi+1)]|. Now, by de:nition
of  , this amounts to show that / ? spi+10:Kn1p1 :::ni+1pi+1 : ∈⊥ for every pi+1∈N and
∈
.
But this is clear, by hypothesis on / since, by the induction hypothesis, we have for
every stack  :Kn1p1 :::ni+1pi+1 : ∈‖Ai+1(n1; p1; : : : ; ni; pi; ni+1; pi+1)‖; and spi+10∈
|Int[spi+10]| by Theorem 8.
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